Aggregate signatures allow anyone to combine different signatures signed by different signers on different messages into a single short signature. An ideal aggregate signature scheme is an identity-based aggregate signature (IBAS) scheme that supports full aggregation since it can reduce the total transmitted data by using an identity string as a public key and anyone can freely aggregate different signatures. Constructing a secure IBAS scheme that supports full aggregation in bilinear maps is an important open problem. Recently, Yuan et al. proposed an IBAS scheme with full aggregation in bilinear maps and claimed its security in the random oracle model under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. In this paper, we show that there exists an efficient forgery attacker on their IBAS scheme and their security proof has a serious flaw.
Introduction
Aggregate signature schemes allow anyone to combine n different signatures on different n messages signed by different n signers into a single short aggregate signature. The main advantage of aggregate signature schemes is to reduce the communication and storage overhead of signatures by compressing these signatures into a single signature. The application of aggregate signature schemes includes secure routing protocols, public-key infrastructure systems, and sensor networks. Boneh et al. [5] proposed the first full aggregate signature scheme in which anyone can combine different signatures in bilinear groups and proved its security in the random oracle model. After that, Lysyanskaya et al. [14] constructed a sequential aggregate signature scheme such that a signature can be combined in sequential order, and Gentry and Ramzan [7] proposed a synchronized aggregate signature scheme such that all signers should share synchronized information. There are many other aggregate signature schemes with different properties [1, 4, 8, 9, [11] [12] [13] 16] .
Although aggregate signature schemes can reduce the size of signatures by aggregation, they usually cannot reduce the total amount of transmitted data significantly since a verifier should retrieve all public keys of the signers. Therefore, reducing the size of public keys is also an important issue in aggregate signature schemes [11, 12, 16 ]. An ideal solution for this problem is to use an identity-based aggregate signature (IBAS) scheme since it uses an already known identity string as the public key of a user [7] . However, there is only one IBAS scheme with full aggregation that was proposed by Hohenberger et al. [9] in multilinear maps. The multilinear map is an attractive tool for cryptographic constructions, but it is currently impractical since it's basis is a leveled homomorphic encryption scheme [6] . There are some IBAS schemes in bilinear maps, but these IBAS schemes only support sequential aggregation or synchronized aggregation [4, 7, 8] . Therefore, construction an IBAS scheme with full aggregation in bilinear maps is an important open problem.
The main reason for the difficulty of devising an IBAS scheme with full aggregation is that it seems not easy to find a way to aggregate the randomness of all signers in which each randomness of a signer is used to hide the private key of each signer in a signing process [7] . For this reason, current IBAS schemes only support synchronized aggregation or sequential aggregation to aggregate the randomness of all signers [4, 7] . Additionally, designing a secure IBAS scheme is not a easy task since even the original version of Boldyreva et al.'s IBAS scheme [3] was broken by Hwang et al. [10] and then it was corrected later. Recently, Yuan et al. proposed an IBAS scheme with full aggregation in bilinear maps and claimed it security in random oracle models [17] . The authors first proposed an IBS scheme in bilinear maps and constructed an IBAS scheme from the IBS scheme. To prove the security their IBS scheme, the authors claimed that the security of their IBS scheme can be proven under the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption by using Forking Lemma in the random oracle model.
In 
The IBAS Scheme of Yuan et al.
In this section, we review bilinear groups and the IBS and IBAS schemes of Yuan et al. [17] .
Bilinear Groups and Complexity Assumptions
Let G and G T be two multiplicative cyclic groups of same prime order p and g be a generator of G. The bilinear map e : G × G → G T has the following properties:
2. Non-degeneracy: ∃g such that e(g, g) has order p, that is, e(g, g) is a generator of G T .
We say that G is a bilinear group if the group operations in G and G T as well as the bilinear map e are all efficiently computable. Furthermore, we assume that the description of G and G T includes generators of G and G T respectively. 
The Identity-Based Signature Scheme
The IBS scheme consists of Setup, GenKey, Sign, and Verify algorithms. The IBS scheme of Yuan et al. [17] is described as follows:
This algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1 λ . It generates bilinear groups G, G T of prime order p. Let g be a random generator of G. It chooses random exponents s 1 , s 2 ∈ Z * p and two cryptographic hash functions H 1 : {0, 1} * → G and
GenKey(ID, MK, PP):
This algorithm takes as input an identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * , the master key MK = (s 1 , s 2 ), and the public parameters PP. It outputs a private key
Sign(M, SK ID , PP):
This algorithm takes as input a message M ∈ {0, 1} * , a private key
, and the public parameters PP. It selects a random exponent r ∈ Z * p and computes
Verify(σ , ID, M, PP):
This algorithm takes as input a signature σ = (U,V,W ), an identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * , a message M{0, 1} * , and the public parameters PP.
It computes h = H(ID M) and checks whether e(V, g)
. If both equations hold, then it outputs 1. Otherwise, it outputs 0. 
Claim 2.2 ( [17]). The above IBS scheme is existentially unforgeable under chosen message attacks in the random oracle model if the CDH assumption holds.

Remark 2.3. The original IBS and IBAS schemes of Yuan et al. is described in the addictive
) is also a valid one where r ′ is a random exponent in Z * p .
The Identity-Based Aggregate Signature Scheme
The IBAS scheme consists of Setup, GenKey, Sign, Verify, Aggregate, and AggVerify algorithms. The Setup, GenKey, Sign, and Verify algorithms of Yuan et al.'s IBAS scheme is the same as those of their IBS scheme. The IBAS scheme of Yuan et al. [17] is described as follows:
2 )} of identity and message pairs, and the public parameters PP. It outputs an aggregate signature
AggVerify(σ , S, PP):
This algorithm takes as input an aggregate signature σ = (U,V,W ), a multiset S = {(ID 1 , M 1 ), . . . , (ID n , M n )} of identity and message pairs, and the public parameters PP. It computes
. . , n and checks whether e(V, g) 
Forgery Attacks on the IBAS Scheme
In this section, we show that the IBS and IBAS schemes of Yuan et al. are not secure at all by presenting an efficient forgery algorithm. In fact, our forgery algorithm is universal since anyone who has two valid signatures on the same identity with different messages can generate a forge signature on the same identity with any message of its choice. Proof. The basic idea of our forgery attack is that if a forger obtains two valid signature on an identity, then a linear combination of these signatures can be another valid signature by carefully choosing scalar values. A forgery algorithm F is described as follows: 
Note that if h 1 = h 2 , then δ 1 , δ 3 can be computed by using Linear Algebra since the determinant h 1 − h 2 of the left matrix is not zero.
3. Finally, F outputs a forged signature σ * on the identity and message pair (ID * , M * ) as
To finish the proof, we should show that the forger F outputs a (forged) signature with non-negligible probability and the forged signature passes the verification algorithm. We known that F always outputs a signature if h 1 = h 2 . Because H 2 is a collision-resistant hash function and M 1 = M 2 , we have that h 1 = h 2 except negligible probability. Now we should show that the forged signature is correct by the verification algorithm. Let r 1 , r 2 be the randomness of σ 1 , σ 2 respectively. The correctness of the forged signature is easily verified as follows
where the randomness of the forged signature is defined as r * = r 1 δ 1 + r 2 δ 2 mod p. This completes the proof.
Corollary 3.2. There exists a PPT algorithm F that can forge the IBAS scheme of Yuan et al. except negligible probability if F makes just two signature queries.
The proof of this corollary is trivial from the proof of the previous Lemma since the IBAS scheme uses the IBS scheme as the underlying signature scheme. We omit the proof.
Our Analysis of the Security Proof
From the forgery attack in the previous section, it is evident that the IBS and IBAS schemes of Yuan et al. are not secure. However, Yuan et al. claimed that their IBS scheme is secure in the random oracle model under the CDH assumption by using Forking Lemma in [17] . In this section, we analyze the security proof of Yuan et al. and show that there is a critical flaw in their security proof that uses Forking Lemma.
The Original Proof
In this subsection, we briefly review the security proof of Yuan et al.'s IBS scheme [17] that solves the CDH problem by using Forking Lemma [2, 15] .
Suppose there exists an adversary A that outputs a forged signature for the IBS scheme with a nonnegligible advantage. A simulator B that solves the CDH problem using A is given: a challenge tuple D = ((p, G, G T , e), g, g a , g b ) . Then B that interacts with A is described as follows: Setup: B chooses a random exponent s 2 ∈ Z * p and maintains H 1 -list and H 2 -list for random oracles. It implicitly sets s 1 = a and publishes the public parameters
Hash Query: If this is an H 1 hash query on an identity ID i , then B handles this query as follows: If the identity ID i already appears in H 1 -list, then it responds with the value in the list. Otherwise, it picks a random coin c ∈ {0, 1} with Pr[c = 0] = δ for some δ and proceeds as follows: If c = 0, then it chooses t i ∈ Z * p and sets 
A finally outputs a forged signature σ * = (U * ,V * ,W * ) on an identity ID * and a message M * .
To solve the CDH problem, B retrieves the tuple (ID * ,t * , c * , Q * ) from the H 1 -list. If c * = 0, then it aborts since it cannot extract the CDH value. Otherwise, it obtains two valid signatures σ * 1 = (U * 1 ,V * 1 ,W * 1 ) and σ * 2 = (U * 2 ,V * 2 ,W * 2 ) on the same identity and message tuple (ID * , M * ) such that U * 1 = U * 2 and h * 1 = h * 2 by applying Forking Lemma. That is, it replays F with the same random tape but different choice of the random oracle H 2 . If U * 1 = U * 2 , then we have the following equation
Thus, B can compute the CDH value as
A Non-Extractable Forgery
To extract the CDH value from forged signatures by applying Forking Lemma, it is essential for the simulator to obtains two valid signatures σ * 1 and σ * 2 such that U * 1 = U * 2 and h * 1 = h * 2 . By replaying a forgery with the same random tape with different choice of random oracle H 2 , it is possible for a simulator to obtain two valid
with h * 1 = h * 2 because of Forking Lemma. However, we show that the probability of U * 1 = U * 2 is negligible for some clever forgery. Proof. The basic idea of this proof is that anyone can re-randomize the signature of Yuan et al.'s IBS scheme by using the public parameters. In this case, even though a simulator use the same random tape for Forking Lemma, a forgery output a forged signature σ * on an identity ID * and a message M * after re-randomizing it by using the information h * = H 2 (ID * M * ). Let H ′ : {0, 1} * → Z p be a collision resistant hash function that is not modeled as the random oracle. A new forgery F that uses A as a sub-routine is described as follows:
1. F is first given PP and runs A by giving PP. F also handles the private key and signature queries of A by using his own private key and signature oracles.
2.
A finally outputs a forged signature σ ′ = (U ′ ,V ′ ,W ′ ) on an identity ID * and a message M * .
F computes
, and then it re-randomizes the forged signature as
4. Finally, F outputs σ * = (U * ,V * ,W * ) as the forged signature on an identity ID * and M * .
To finish the proof, we should show that the forged signature of F is correct and the simulator of Yuan et al. cannot extract the CDH value from the forged signatures by using Forking Lemma. Let r ′ be the randomness of σ ′ . The correctness of the forged signature is easily checked as follows
where h * = H 2 (ID * M * ) and r * = r ′ + h ′ . To extract the CDH value from the forged signature of F by using Forking Lemma, the simulator of respectively. Therefore, the event that the simulator obtains two valid signatures such that U * 1 = U * 2 and h * 1 = h * 2 by using Forking Lemma only occurs with negligible probability. This completes our proof.
Discussions
From the above analysis, we know that the original IBS scheme of Yuan et al. cannot be proven secure under the CDH assumption by applying Forking Lemma since the signature is publicly re-randomizable. To fix this problem, we may modify the IBS scheme to compute h = H 2 (U ID M) instead of h = H 2 (ID M) where U is the first element of a signature. In this case, the signature of the modified IBS scheme is not re-randomizable since U is given to the input of H 2 . Note that our forgery attack in the previous section also does not work in this modified IBS scheme. However, this modified IBS scheme does not lead to an IBAS scheme since each U in individual signatures cannot be aggregated. Note that if each U is aggregated, then a verifier cannot check the validity of an aggregate signature since each U is not given in the aggregate signature. Therefore, there is no easy fix to solve the problem.
Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that the IBS and IBAS schemes of Yuan et al. are not secure at all. We first presented an efficient forgery attack on the IBS scheme and their security proof of the IBS scheme has a serious flaw. The IBAS scheme is also not secure since the security of their IBAS scheme is based on the security of their IBS scheme. Therefore, constructing an IBAS scheme with full aggregation in bilinear maps is still left as an important open problem.
